Dynamics and Stability Analysis of a Stackelberg Mixed Duopoly Game with Price Competition in Insurance Market | Zendy

Longfei Wei | Zendy; Haiwei Wang | Zendy; Jing Wang | Zendy; Jialong Hou | Zendy

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Dynamics and Stability Analysis of a Stackelberg Mixed Duopoly Game with Price Competition in Insurance Market

Author(s) -

Longfei Wei,

Haiwei Wang,

Jing Wang,

Jialong Hou

Publication year - 2021

Publication title -

discrete dynamics in nature and society

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Journals

SCImago Journal Rank - 0.264

H-Index - 39

eISSN - 1607-887X

pISSN - 1026-0226

DOI - 10.1155/2021/3985367

Subject(s) - duopoly , stackelberg competition , nash equilibrium , microeconomics , economics , competition (biology) , price of stability , stability (learning theory) , best response , zero sum game , oligopoly , mathematical economics , computer science , monetary economics , monetary policy , ecology , machine learning , cournot competition , biology

This paper investigates the dynamical behaviors of a Stackelberg mixed duopoly game with price competition in the insurance market, involving one state-owned public insurance company and one private insurance company. We study and compare the stability conditions for the Nash equilibrium points of two sequential-move games, public leadership, and private leadership games. Numerical simulations present complicated dynamic behaviors. It is shown that the Nash equilibrium becomes unstable as the price adjustment speed increases, and the system eventually becomes chaotic via flip bifurcation. Moreover, the time-delayed feedback control is used to force the system back to stability.

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