Research on Public Rental Housing PPP Project Launching Dilemmas with Dynamic Evolutionary Game | Zendy

Xuan Zhou | Zendy; Dan Liu | Zendy; Chuanbin Yin | Zendy

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Research on Public Rental Housing PPP Project Launching Dilemmas with Dynamic Evolutionary Game

Author(s) -

Xuan Zhou,

Dan Liu,

Chuanbin Yin

Publication year - 2021

Publication title -

advances in civil engineering

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Journals

SCImago Journal Rank - 0.379

H-Index - 25

eISSN - 1687-8094

pISSN - 1687-8086

DOI - 10.1155/2021/1805874

Subject(s) - incentive , government (linguistics) , sequential game , transaction cost , database transaction , renting , business , microeconomics , evolutionary game theory , economics , game theory , industrial organization , computer science , engineering , linguistics , philosophy , civil engineering , programming language

The public housing PPP projects have encountered a cold reception from the government, which constrained solving the urban housing problem. This paper builds a dynamic game model under incomplete contract conditions, analyzes the key factors affecting the signing of PPP contracts by dynamic evolutionary game analysis, and verifies these factors by simulation. The results show that fiscal spending smoothing, risk transfer, and government performance can promote government to adopt cooperation strategy. Expected project benefits and government performance incentives can promote private capital to adopt cooperation strategy. Changes in transaction cost have a significant impact on the decision of cooperation strategy.

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