z-logo
open-access-imgOpen Access
Publicly Verifiable M + 1st-Price Auction Fit for IoT with Minimum Storage
Author(s) -
Po-Chu Hsu,
Atsuko Miyaji
Publication year - 2021
Publication title -
security and communication networks
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.446
H-Index - 43
eISSN - 1939-0114
pISSN - 1939-0122
DOI - 10.1155/2021/1615117
Subject(s) - computer science , verifiable secret sharing , internet of things , computer security , programming language , set (abstract data type)
In an M + 1 st-price auction, all bidders submit their bids simultaneously, and the M highest bidders purchase M identical goods at the M + 1 st bidding price. Previous research is constructed based on trusted managers such as a trusted third party (TTP), trusted mix servers, and honest managers. All of the previous auctions are not fit for edge-assisted IoT since they need TTP. In this paper, we formalize a notion of commutative bi-homomorphic multiparty encryption and achieve no-TTP M + 1 -st auction based on blockchain with public verifiability. Our M + 1 st auction guarantees financial fairness, robustness, and correctness without TTP and is secure under a malicious model for the first time. Our M + 1 st auction can be executed over a distributed network and is thus fit for edge-assisted IoT. Furthermore, our formalized commutative bi-homomorphic multiparty encryption can be used in various applications for edge-assisted IoT, which needs to protect privacy and correctness.

The content you want is available to Zendy users.

Already have an account? Click here to sign in.
Having issues? You can contact us here
Accelerating Research

Address

John Eccles House
Robert Robinson Avenue,
Oxford Science Park, Oxford
OX4 4GP, United Kingdom