Quality Improvement Policies in a Supply Chain with Stackelberg Games | Zendy

Gang Xie | Zendy; Wuyi Yue | Zendy; Shouyang Wang | Zendy

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Quality Improvement Policies in a Supply Chain with Stackelberg Games

Author(s) -

Gang Xie,

Wuyi Yue,

Shouyang Wang

Publication year - 2014

Publication title -

journal of applied mathematics

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Journals

SCImago Journal Rank - 0.307

H-Index - 43

eISSN - 1687-0042

pISSN - 1110-757X

DOI - 10.1155/2014/848593

Subject(s) - stackelberg competition , supply chain , quality (philosophy) , pareto principle , pareto optimal , computer science , mathematical optimization , microeconomics , industrial organization , environmental economics , business , multi objective optimization , economics , mathematics , marketing , philosophy , epistemology

We first analyze quality and price decisions in a supply chain with two Stackelberg games: Manufacturer’s Stackelberg (MS) and Supplier’s Stackelberg (SS). Then, we investigate how equilibrium solutions are influenced by proposed quality improvement policies: coordination and manufacturer’s involvement. Also, we derive the conditions under which the policies can be implemented in both MS and SS strategies. Numerical experiments illustrate the problems and several related issues are discussed. The results suggest that proposed quality improvement policies can realize Pareto improvement for the supply chain performance

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