Research on Multiprincipals Selecting Effective Agency Mode in the Student Loan System | Zendy

Libo Ding | Zendy; Bangyi Li | Zendy; Suling Feng | Zendy

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Research on Multiprincipals Selecting Effective Agency Mode in the Student Loan System

Author(s) -

Libo Ding,

Bangyi Li,

Suling Feng

Publication year - 2014

Publication title -

mathematical problems in engineering

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Journals

SCImago Journal Rank - 0.262

H-Index - 62

eISSN - 1026-7077

pISSN - 1024-123X

DOI - 10.1155/2014/835254

Subject(s) - observability , principal–agent problem , incentive , mode (computer interface) , task (project management) , agency (philosophy) , loan , principal (computer security) , microeconomics , moral hazard , business , actuarial science , computer science , economics , mathematics , finance , computer security , management , human–computer interaction , corporate governance , philosophy , epistemology

An effective agency mode is the key to solve incentive problems in Chinese student loan system. Principal-agent frameworks are considered in which two principals share one common agent that is performing one single task but each prefers the different aspect of the task. Three models are built and decision mechanisms are given. The studies show that the three modes have different effects. Exclusive dealing mode is not good for long-term effect because sometimes it guides agent ignoring repayment. If effort proportionality coefficient and observability are both unchanged, principals all prefer common agency, but independent contracting mode may be more efficient in reality because not only the total outputs under that mode are larger than those under cooperation one, but also preferring independent contracting mode can stimulate the bank participating in the game

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