Information Exchange rather than Topology Awareness: Cooperation between P2P Overlay and Traffic Engineering

Solutions to the routing strategic conflict between noncooperative P2P overlay and ISP underlay go separate ways: hyperselfishness and cooperation. Unpredictable (possibly adverse) impact of the hyperselfish topology awareness, which is adopted in both overlay routing and traffic engineering, has not been sufficiently studied in the literature. Topology-related information exchange in a cooperatively efficient way should be highlighted to alleviate the cross-layer conflict. In this paper, we first illustrate the hyperselfish weakness with two dynamic noncooperative game models in which hyperselfish overlay or underlay has to accept a suboptimal profit. Then we build a synergistic cost-saving (SC) game model to reduce the negative effects of noncooperation. In the SC model, through information exchange, that is, the classified path-delay metrics for P2P overlay and peer locations for underlay, P2P overlay selects proximity as well as saving traffic transit cost for underlay, and ISP underlay adjusts routing to optimize network cost as well as indicating short delay paths for P2P. Simulations based on the real and generated topologies validate cost improvement by SC model and find a proper remote threshold value to limit P2P traffic from remote area, cross-AS, or cross-ISP