Welfare Comparison of Leader-Follower Models in a Mixed Duopoly | Zendy

Aiyuan Tao | Zendy; Zhu Yingjun | Zendy; Xiangqing Zou | Zendy

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Welfare Comparison of Leader-Follower Models in a Mixed Duopoly

Author(s) -

Aiyuan Tao,

Zhu Yingjun,

Xiangqing Zou

Publication year - 2013

Publication title -

journal of applied mathematics

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Journals

SCImago Journal Rank - 0.307

H-Index - 43

eISSN - 1687-0042

pISSN - 1110-757X

DOI - 10.1155/2013/320712

Subject(s) - duopoly , welfare , microeconomics , outcome (game theory) , economics , cournot competition , market economy

In the standard leader-follower duopoly models with otherwise symmetric firms, the market outcome and total welfare are the same whichever firm is the leader. This paper studies and compares total welfare in a sequential-move mixed duopoly when either the public firm or the private firm acts as the leader. It is found that the fact that which firm is the leader affects total welfare and that whether firms compete in quantity or price also affects the optimal choice of market leader

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