Security Analysis of HMAC/NMAC by Using Fault Injection | Zendy

Kitae Jeong | Zendy; Yuseop Lee | Zendy; Jaechul Sung | Zendy; Seokhie Hong | Zendy

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Security Analysis of HMAC/NMAC by Using Fault Injection

Author(s) -

Kitae Jeong,

Yuseop Lee,

Jaechul Sung,

Seokhie Hong

Publication year - 2013

Publication title -

journal of applied mathematics

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Journals

SCImago Journal Rank - 0.307

H-Index - 43

eISSN - 1687-0042

pISSN - 1110-757X

DOI - 10.1155/2013/101907

Subject(s) - hash based message authentication code , hash function , computer science , key (lock) , syrian refugees , algorithm , computer security , message authentication code , cryptography , refugee , law , political science

In Choukri and Tunstall (2005), the authors showed that if they decreased the number of rounds in AES by injecting faults, it is possible to recover the secret key. In this paper, we propose fault injection attacks on HMAC/NMAC by applying the main idea of their attack. These attacks are applicable to HMAC/NMAC based on the MD-family hash functions and can recover the secret key with the negligible computational complexity. Particularly, these results on HMAC/NMAC-SHA-2 are the first known key recovery attacks so far

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