Discrete Dynamics in Evolutionary Games | Zendy

Orlando Gomes | Zendy

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Discrete Dynamics in Evolutionary Games

Author(s) -

Orlando Gomes

Publication year - 2012

Publication title -

discrete dynamics in nature and society

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Journals

SCImago Journal Rank - 0.264

H-Index - 39

eISSN - 1607-887X

pISSN - 1026-0226

DOI - 10.1155/2012/416789

Subject(s) - replicator equation , outcome (game theory) , evolutionary dynamics , mechanism (biology) , evolutionarily stable strategy , evolutionary game theory , mathematical economics , computer science , dynamics (music) , game theory , mathematics , psychology , population , sociology , physics , pedagogy , demography , quantum mechanics

This paper furnishes a guide for the study of 2-dimensional evolutionary games in discrete time. Evolutionarily stable strategies are identified and nonlinear outcomes are explored. Besides the baseline payoffs of the established strategic interaction, the following elements are also vital to determine the dynamic outcome of a game: the initial fitness of each agent and the rule of motion that describes how individuals switch between strategies. In addition to the dynamic rule commonly used in evolutionary games, the replicator dynamics, we propose another rule, which acknowledges the role of expectations and sophisticates the replicator mechanism

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