Supply Chain Coordination under Stock- and Price-Dependent Selling Rates under Declining Market | Zendy

Subrata Saha | Zendy; Sambhu Das | Zendy; Manjusri Basu | Zendy

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Supply Chain Coordination under Stock- and Price-Dependent Selling Rates under Declining Market

Author(s) -

Subrata Saha,

Sambhu Das,

Manjusri Basu

Publication year - 2011

Publication title -

advances in operations research

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Journals

SCImago Journal Rank - 0.379

H-Index - 14

eISSN - 1687-9155

pISSN - 1687-9147

DOI - 10.1155/2012/375128

Subject(s) - stackelberg competition , distributor , supply chain , revenue sharing , microeconomics , revenue , stock (firearms) , coordination game , economics , business , industrial organization , finance , marketing , mechanical engineering , engineering

We explore coordination issues of a two-echelon supply chain, consisting of a distributor and a retailer. The effect of revenue-sharing contract mechanism is examined under stock-time-price-sensitive demand rate. First, we investigate relationships between distributor and retailer under noncooperative distributor-Stackelberg games. Then we establish analytically that revenue sharing contact is able to coordinate the system and leads to the win-win outcomes. Finally, numerical examples are presented to compare results between the different models

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