Towards Formal Analysis of Insider Threats for Auctions | Zendy

Florian Kammueller | Zendy; Manfred Kerber | Zendy; Christian W. Probst | Zendy

AI Assistant Blog Pricing

Home ZAIA Blog

Open Access

Towards Formal Analysis of Insider Threats for Auctions

Author(s) -

Florian Kammueller,

Manfred Kerber,

Christian W. Probst

Publication year - 2016

Publication title -

middlesex university research repository (middlesex university of london)

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Conference proceedings

DOI - 10.1145/2995959.2995963

Subject(s) - common value auction , computer science , correctness , computer security , insider , cryptographic protocol , insider threat , cryptography , vulnerability (computing) , protocol (science) , security analysis , theoretical computer science , algorithm , microeconomics , law , economics , political science , medicine , alternative medicine , pathology

This paper brings together the world of insider threats and auctions. For online-auction systems, like eBay, but also for high-value one-off auction algorithms as they are used for selling radio wave frequencies, the use of rigorous machine supported modelling and verification techniques is meaningful to prove correctness and scrutinize vulnerability to security and privacy attacks. Surveying the threats in auctions and insider collusions, we present an approach to model and analyze auction protocols for insider threats using the interactive theorem prover Isabelle. As a case study, we use the cocaine auction protocol that represents a nice combination of cryptographic techniques, protocols, and privacy goals suitable for highlighting insider threats for auctions

The content you want is available to Zendy users.

Already have an account? Click here to sign in.

Having issues? You can contact us here

Accelerating Research