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Balancing accountability and privacy in the network
Author(s) -
David Naylor,
Matthew K. Mukerjee,
Peter Steenkiste
Publication year - 2014
Publication title -
acm sigcomm computer communication review
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.542
H-Index - 170
eISSN - 1943-5819
pISSN - 0146-4833
DOI - 10.1145/2740070.2626306
Subject(s) - accountability , the internet , internet privacy , computer science , computer security , network packet , world wide web , law , political science
Though most would agree that accountability and privacy are both valuable, today's Internet provides little support for either. Previous efforts have explored ways to offer stronger guarantees for one of the two, typically at the expense of the other; indeed, at first glance accountability and privacy appear mutually exclusive. At the center of the tussle is the source address: in an accountable Internet, source addresses undeniably link packets and senders so hosts can be punished for bad behavior. In a privacy-preserving Internet, source addresses are hidden as much as possible. In this paper, we argue that a balance is possible. We introduce the Accountable and Private Internet Protocol (APIP), which splits source addresses into two separate fields --- an accountability address and a return address --- and introduces independent mechanisms for managing each. Accountability addresses, rather than pointing to hosts, point to accountability delegates, which agree to vouch for packets on their clients' behalves, taking appropriate action when misbehavior is reported. With accountability handled by delegates, senders are now free to mask their return addresses; we discuss a few techniques for doing so.

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