Truthful prioritization for dynamic bandwidth sharing
Author(s) -
Victor Shnayder,
David C. Parkes,
Vikas Kawadia,
Jeremy Hoon
Publication year - 2014
Publication title -
digital access to scholarship at harvard (dash) (harvard university)
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Conference proceedings
DOI - 10.1145/2632951.2632956
Subject(s) - pooling , computer science , incentive , bandwidth (computing) , prioritization , revenue , bandwidth allocation , dynamic bandwidth allocation , incentive compatibility , mechanism design , scheme (mathematics) , operations research , computer network , microeconomics , business , economics , artificial intelligence , engineering , process management , mathematical analysis , accounting , mathematics
We design a protocol for dynamic prioritization of data on shared routers such as untethered 3G/4G devices. The mechanism prioritizes bandwidth in favor of users with the highest value, and is incentive compatible, so that users can simply report their true values for network access. A revenue pooling mechanism also aligns incentives for sellers, so that they will choose to use prioritization methods that retain the incentive properties on the buy-side. In this way, the design allows for an open architecture. In addition to revenue pooling, the technical contribution is to identify a class of stochastic demand models and a prioritization scheme that provides allocation monotonicity. Simulation results confirm efficiency gains from dynamic prioritization relative to prior methods, as well as the effectiveness of revenue pooling.
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