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Author(s) -
Nick Nikiforakis,
Luca Invernizzi,
Alexandros Kapravelos,
Steven Van Acker,
Wouter Joosen,
Christopher Kruegel,
Frank Piessens,
Giovanni Vigna
Publication year - 2012
Publication title -
proceedings of the acm conference on computer and communications security
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Conference proceedings
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.023
H-Index - 176
ISSN - 1543-7221
DOI - 10.1145/2382196.2382274
Subject(s) - javascript , computer science , world wide web , scripting language , interactivity , cross site scripting , rich internet application , web page , unobtrusive javascript , web application , namespace , web development , database , web application security , operating system
JavaScript is used by web developers to enhance the interactivity of their sites, offload work to the users' browsers and improve their sites' responsiveness and user-friendliness, making web pages feel and behave like traditional desktop applications. An important feature of JavaScript, is the ability to combine multiple libraries from local and remote sources into the same page, under the same namespace. While this enables the creation of more advanced web applications, it also allows for a malicious JavaScript provider to steal data from other scripts and from the page itself. Today, when developers include remote JavaScript libraries, they trust that the remote providers will not abuse the power bestowed upon them. In this paper, we report on a large-scale crawl of more than three million pages of the top 10,000 Alexa sites, and identify the trust relationships of these sites with their library providers. We show the evolution of JavaScript inclusions over time and develop a set of metrics in order to assess the maintenance-quality of each JavaScript provider, showing that in some cases, top Internet sites trust remote providers that could be successfully compromised by determined attackers and subsequently serve malicious JavaScript. In this process, we identify four, previously unknown, types of vulnerabilities that attackers could use to attack popular web sites. Lastly, we review some proposed ways of protecting a web application from malicious remote scripts and show that some of them may not be as effective as previously thought.

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