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Optimal dynamic mechanism design via a virtual VCG mechanism
Author(s) -
Sham M. Kakade,
Ilan Lobel,
Hamid Nazerzadeh
Publication year - 2011
Publication title -
acm sigecom exchanges
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
ISSN - 1551-9031
DOI - 10.1145/1978721.1978728
Subject(s) - mechanism (biology) , mechanism design , computer science , affine transformation , separable space , simple (philosophy) , mathematical optimization , vickrey–clarke–groves auction , transformation (genetics) , mathematics , mathematical economics , common value auction , mathematical analysis , philosophy , statistics , biochemistry , chemistry , epistemology , auction theory , pure mathematics , gene
We consider the problem of designing revenue maximizing mechanisms for dynamic settings. We propose a simple optimal mechanism for rather general "separable" settings. The proposed mechanism is implemented via an affine transformation of a dynamic VCG mechanism.

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