Beating the best Nash without regret
Author(s) -
Katrina Ligett,
Georgios Piliouras
Publication year - 2011
Publication title -
acm sigecom exchanges
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
ISSN - 1551-9031
DOI - 10.1145/1978721.1978727
Subject(s) - nash equilibrium , epsilon equilibrium , mathematical economics , best response , risk dominance , regret , equilibrium selection , de facto , computer science , solution concept , game theory , economics , repeated game , machine learning , political science , law
Nash equilibrium analysis has become the de facto solution standard in game theory. This approach, despite its prominent role, has been the subject of much criticism for being too optimistic. Indeed, in general games, natural play need not converge to Nash equilibria. In games with multiple equilibria, it is unclear how players are expected to coordinate; even in games with a unique equilibrium, finding it may involve unreasonable expectations on player communication or computation.
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