End-to-end link power control in optical networks using Nash bargaining solution
Author(s) -
Quanyan Zhu,
Lacra Pavel
Publication year - 2007
Language(s) - English
DOI - 10.1145/1345263.1345276
An efficient and intelligent resource allocation mechanism is the heart of any communication networks. Based on previous work on non-cooperative game approach and direct centralized optimization, this paper addresses the issue of efficiency and fairness in optical network power control. We use Nash bargaining solution (NBS) to achieve a fair and efficient solution for optical network power control at the end-to-end optical link level. We study different formulations based on Nash bargaining model and characterize their solutions.
Accelerating Research
Robert Robinson Avenue,
Oxford Science Park, Oxford
OX4 4GP, United Kingdom
Address
John Eccles HouseRobert Robinson Avenue,
Oxford Science Park, Oxford
OX4 4GP, United Kingdom