Verifying Completeness of Relational Query Answers from Online Servers
Author(s) -
HweeHwa Pang,
KianLee Tan
Publication year - 2008
Publication title -
acm transactions on information and system security
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 1557-7406
pISSN - 1094-9224
DOI - 10.1145/1330332.1330337
Subject(s) - computer science , server , tuple , completeness (order theory) , authentication (law) , complement (music) , web search query , key (lock) , the internet , range query (database) , scheme (mathematics) , information retrieval , web query classification , theoretical computer science , computer network , computer security , world wide web , search engine , mathematical analysis , biochemistry , chemistry , mathematics , discrete mathematics , complementation , gene , phenotype
The number of successful attacks on the Internet shows that it is very difficult to guarantee the security of online servers over extended periods of time. A breached server that is not detected in time may return incorrect query answers to users. In this article, we introduce authentication schemes for users to verify that their query answers from an online server are complete (i.e., no qualifying tuples are omitted) and authentic (i.e., all the result values are legitimate). We introduce a scheme that supports range selection, projection as well as primary key-foreign key join queries on relational databases. We also present authentication schemes for single- and multi-attribute range aggregate queries. The schemes complement access control mechanisms that rewrite queries dynamically, and are computationally secure. We have implemented the proposed schemes, and experiment results showed that they are practical and feasible schemes with low overheads.
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