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A price-based reliable routing game in wireless networks
Author(s) -
Hua Liu,
Bhaskar Krishnamachari
Publication year - 2006
Publication title -
citeseer x (the pennsylvania state university)
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Conference proceedings
ISBN - 1-59593-507-X
DOI - 10.1145/1190195.1190201
Subject(s) - computer network , computer science , dynamic source routing , equal cost multi path routing , geographic routing , static routing , link state routing protocol , source routing , nash equilibrium , distributed computing , multipath routing , destination sequenced distance vector routing , dsrflow , policy based routing , node (physics) , routing (electronic design automation) , routing protocol , mathematical optimization , engineering , mathematics , structural engineering
We investigate a price-based reliable routing game in a wireless network of selfish users. Each node is characterized by a probability of reliably forwarding a packet, and each link is characterized by a cost of transmission. The objective is to form a stable and reliable routing path between a given source and destination pair. The pricing mechanism involved in this routing game is destination-driven and source-mediated: for each successfully delivered packet, the destination node pays the source, which in turn compensates all nodes that participate in routing the packet. We develop a polynomial-time algorithm for deriving an efficient Nash equilibrium routing path. We also present simulations to evaluate the reliability of the obtained path with respect to prices and source-destination cooperation for different network settings.

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