Open AccessHigh-order punishment and the evolution of cooperation
Author(s) -
Bastian Baranski,
Thomas Bartz–Beielstein,
Rüdiger Ehlers,
Thusinthan Kajendran,
Björn Kosslers,
Jörn Mehnen,
Tomasz Polaszek,
Ralf Reimholz,
Jens M. Schmidt,
Karlheinz Schmitt,
Danny Seis,
Rafael Slodzinski,
Simon Steeg,
Nils Wiemann,
Marc Christian Zimmermann
Publication year - 2006
Publication title -
citeseer x (the pennsylvania state university)
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Conference proceedings
ISBN - 1-59593-186-4
DOI - 10.1145/1143997.1144065
Subject(s) - order (exchange) , punishment (psychology) , computer science , business , psychology , social psychology , finance
The Prisoner's Dilemma and the Public Goods Game are models to study mechanisms leading to the evolution of cooperation. From a simplified rational and egoistic perspective there should be no altruistic cooperation in these games at all. Previous studies observed circumstances under which cooperation can emerge. This paper demonstrates that high-order punishment opportunities can maintain a higher cooperation level in an agent based simulation of the evolution of cooperation.
Accelerating Research
Robert Robinson Avenue,
Oxford Science Park, Oxford
OX4 4GP, United Kingdom
Address
John Eccles HouseRobert Robinson Avenue,
Oxford Science Park, Oxford
OX4 4GP, United Kingdom