Open AccessEquilibrium analyses of market-driven agents
Author(s) -
Kwang Mong Sim
Publication year - 2003
Publication title -
acm sigecom exchanges
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
ISSN - 1551-9031
DOI - 10.1145/1120709.1120715
Subject(s) - negotiation , competition (biology) , microeconomics , computer science , industrial organization , stability (learning theory) , work (physics) , business , economics , mechanical engineering , ecology , machine learning , political science , law , biology , engineering
Market-driven agents (MDAs) are negotiation agents that make adjustable amounts of concession by considering factors such as competition, deadlines, and trading options. While previous work demonstrates the properties of MDAs by experiments, this paper provides mathematical analyses to show that (1) for a given market situation, an MDA makes minimally sufficient concession, and (2) the strategies adopted by MDAs are in equilibrium. The results show that MDAs are stable (stability is an essential evaluation criterion for negotiation agents) and they avoid making excessive or inadequate concession in a market situation.
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