On the (In)efficiency of MFG Equilibria | Zendy

Pierre Cardaliaguet | Zendy; Catherine Rainer | Zendy

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On the (In)efficiency of MFG Equilibria

Author(s) -

Pierre Cardaliaguet,

Catherine Rainer

Publication year - 2019

Publication title -

siam journal on control and optimization

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Journals

SCImago Journal Rank - 1.486

H-Index - 116

eISSN - 1095-7138

pISSN - 0363-0129

DOI - 10.1137/18m1172363

Subject(s) - nash equilibrium , infinitesimal , context (archaeology) , social planner , mathematical economics , mathematical optimization , mathematics , planner , computer science , economics , microeconomics , mathematical analysis , paleontology , biology , programming language

Mean field games (MFG) are dynamic games with infinitely many infinitesimal agents. In this context, we study the efficiency of Nash MFG equilibria: Namely, we compare the social cost of a MFG equilibrium with the minimal cost a global planner can achieve. We find a structure condition on the game under which there exists efficient MFG equilibria and, in case this condition is not fulfilled, quantify how inefficient MFG equilibria are.

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