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Moral Knowledge by Deduction
Author(s) -
Smithies Declan
Publication year - 2022
Publication title -
philosophy and phenomenological research
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.7
H-Index - 39
eISSN - 1933-1592
pISSN - 0031-8205
DOI - 10.1111/phpr.12780
Subject(s) - epistemology , relation (database) , philosophy , analytic philosophy , moral reasoning , contemporary philosophy , computer science , database
How is moral knowledge possible? This paper defends the anti‐Humean thesis that we can acquire moral knowledge by deduction from wholly non‐moral premises. According to Hume’s Law, as it has become known, we cannot deduce an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’, since it is “altogether inconceivable how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it” (1739: 3.1.1). This paper explores the prospects for an inferentialist theory of deductive moral knowledge that rejects Hume’s Law.