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On General and Non‐General Abilities
Author(s) -
Kittle Simon
Publication year - 2023
Publication title -
pacific philosophical quarterly
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.914
H-Index - 32
eISSN - 1468-0114
pISSN - 0279-0750
DOI - 10.1111/papq.12424
Subject(s) - generality , possession (linguistics) , virtue , modality (human–computer interaction) , epistemology , psychology , cognitive psychology , cognitive science , computer science , philosophy , linguistics , artificial intelligence , psychotherapist
I distinguish two ways an ability might be general: (i) an ability might be general in that its possession doesn't entail the possession of an opportunity; (ii) an ability might be general in virtue of pertaining to a wide range of circumstances. I argue that these two types of generality – I refer to them with the terms ‘general’ and ‘generic’, respectively – produce two orthogonal distinctions among abilities. I show that the two types of generality are sometimes run together by those writing on free will and argue that both types of generality are relevant to understanding the modality of abilities.