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The social epistemology of introspection
Author(s) -
Unnsteinsson Elmar
Publication year - 2023
Publication title -
mind and language
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.905
H-Index - 68
eISSN - 1468-0017
pISSN - 0268-1064
DOI - 10.1111/mila.12438
Subject(s) - introspection , epistemology , mental state , psychology , mental representation , representation (politics) , object (grammar) , state (computer science) , theory of mind , philosophy of mind , cognitive science , cognitive psychology , social psychology , philosophy , cognition , computer science , linguistics , metaphysics , algorithm , neuroscience , politics , political science , law
I argue that introspection recruits the same mental mechanism as that which is required for the production of ordinary speech acts. In introspection, in effect, we intentionally tell ourselves that we are in some mental state, aiming thereby to produce belief about that state in ourselves. On one popular view of speech acts, however, this is precisely what speakers do when speaking to others. On this basis, I argue that every bias discovered by social epistemology applies to introspection and other forms of self‐directed representation. If so, it becomes unclear in what sense social epistemology is social.