Cooperation and Institution in Games | Zendy

Okada Akira | Zendy

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Cooperation and Institution in Games

Author(s) -

Okada Akira

Publication year - 2015

Publication title -

the japanese economic review

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Journals

SCImago Journal Rank - 0.205

H-Index - 28

eISSN - 1468-5876

pISSN - 1352-4739

DOI - 10.1111/jere.12058

Subject(s) - institution , economics , enforcement , externality , unemployment , foundation (evidence) , microeconomics , game theory , wage bargaining , complete information , mathematical economics , political science , macroeconomics , law

Based on recent developments in non‐cooperative coalitional bargaining theory, I review game theoretical analyses of cooperation and institution. First, I present basic results of the random‐proposer model and apply them to the problem of involuntary unemployment in a labour market. I discuss extensions to cooperative games with externalities and incomplete information. Next, I consider the enforceability of an agreement as an institutional foundation of cooperation. I re‐examine the contractarian approach to the problem of cooperation from the viewpoint that individuals may voluntarily create an enforcement institution.

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