Open AccessTESTING ENFORCEMENT STRATEGIES IN THE FIELD: THREAT, MORAL APPEAL AND SOCIAL INFORMATION
Author(s) -
Fellner Gerlinde,
Sausgruber Rupert,
Traxler Christian
Publication year - 2013
Publication title -
journal of the european economic association
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 7.792
H-Index - 93
eISSN - 1542-4774
pISSN - 1542-4766
DOI - 10.1111/jeea.12013
Subject(s) - compliance (psychology) , appeal , license , enforcement , evasion (ethics) , law enforcement , salient , business , field (mathematics) , social psychology , law , psychology , political science , mathematics , pure mathematics , immune system , immunology , biology
We run a large‐scale natural field experiment to evaluate alternative strategies to enforce compliance with the law. The experiment varies the text of mailings sent to potential evaders of TV license fees. We find a strong effect of mailings, leading to a substantial increase in compliance. Among different mailings, a threat treatment which makes a high detection risk salient has a significant deterrent effect. Neither appealing to morals nor imparting information about others’ behavior enhances compliance on aggregate. However, the information condition has a weak positive effect in municipalities where evasion is believed to be common.