Open AccessMATCHING IN INFORMAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
Author(s) -
Eeckhout Jan,
Munshi Kaivan
Publication year - 2010
Publication title -
journal of the european economic association
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 7.792
H-Index - 93
eISSN - 1542-4774
pISSN - 1542-4766
DOI - 10.1111/j.1542-4774.2010.tb00545.x
Subject(s) - sort , matching (statistics) , institution , phenomenon , microeconomics , financial institution , competitive equilibrium , economics , business , finance , computer science , political science , mathematics , law , statistics , physics , quantum mechanics , information retrieval
This paper analyzes an informal financial institution that brings heterogeneous agents together in groups. We analyze decentralized matching into these groups, and the equilibrium composition of participants that consequently arises. We find that participants sort remarkably well across the competing groups, and that they re‐sort immediately following an unexpected exogenous regulatory change. These findings suggest that the competitive matching model might have applicability and bite in other settings where matching is an important equilibrium phenomenon. (JEL: O12, O17, G20, D40)