Open AccessSCREENING DISABILITY INSURANCE APPLICATIONS
Author(s) -
de Jong Philip,
Lindeboom Maarten,
van der Klaauw Bas
Publication year - 2011
Publication title -
journal of the european economic association
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 7.792
H-Index - 93
eISSN - 1542-4774
pISSN - 1542-4766
DOI - 10.1111/j.1542-4774.2010.01002.x
Subject(s) - library science , health insurance , actuarial science , economics , sociology , political science , law , computer science , health care
This paper investigates the effects of stricter screening of disability insurance applications. A large‐scale experiment was set up wherein two of the 26 Dutch regions caseworkers of the disability insurance administration were instructed to screen applications more stringently. The empirical results show that stricter screening reduces long‐term sickness absenteeism and disability insurance applications. We find evidence for direct effects of stricter screening on work resumption during the period of sickness absence and for self‐screening by potential disability insurance applicants. Furthermore, stricter screening improves targeting efficiency without inducing negative spillover effects on the inflow into unemployment insurance.