Open AccessInfluence Of Over‐ And Underconfidence On A Marriage Market *
Author(s) -
Maruyama Akiko
Publication year - 2013
Publication title -
the japanese economic review
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.205
H-Index - 28
eISSN - 1468-5876
pISSN - 1352-4739
DOI - 10.1111/j.1468-5876.2012.00575.x
Subject(s) - externality , economics , ranking (information retrieval) , marriage market , microeconomics , charm (quantum number) , social psychology , positive economics , psychology , labour economics , computer science , physics , quantum mechanics , machine learning
This paper examines misconfidence (over‐ or underconfidence) and marriage proposal strategies in a two‐sided search model with non‐transferable utility. Single agents are vertically heterogeneous—there exists a ranking of marital charm (types). It is shown that there are two externalities to over‐ or underconfident behaviour: someone's over‐ or underconfidence affects: (i) the duration of search for others who directly meet over‐ or underconfident agents; and (ii) the marriage decision of others who directly or indirectly meet over‐ or underconfident agents. Furthermore, these externalities prevent the lowest‐type agents from marrying in an equilibrium.