Open AccessChoosing How to Cooperate: A Repeated Public‐Goods Model of International Relations
Author(s) -
Stone Randall W.,
Slantchev Branislav L.,
London Tamar R.
Publication year - 2008
Publication title -
international studies quarterly
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.897
H-Index - 100
eISSN - 1468-2478
pISSN - 0020-8833
DOI - 10.1111/j.1468-2478.2008.00504.x
Subject(s) - multilateralism , public good , dilemma , hegemony , state (computer science) , international relations theory , international relations , economics , power (physics) , repeated game , law and economics , sociology , political science , game theory , microeconomics , law , computer science , epistemology , philosophy , physics , algorithm , quantum mechanics , politics
International relations theory has borrowed important intuitions from Olson's static public‐goods model (hegemonic stability) and the repeated prisoners’ dilemma (theories of international cooperation), and arguments often combine implications from both models. We develop a general, repeated public‐goods model. We then allow the qualitative dimensions of cooperation to emerge endogenously: agreements can have broad or narrow membership and entail deep or shallow commitments; they can be multilateral or discriminatory; they can be ad hoc or institutionalized. We find that the relationship between the distribution of power and international cooperation is complex: a large leading state forms a narrow coalition of intensive contributors, and builds institutions, while a smaller leading state forms a broader coalition that makes shallow contributions, and is more inclined to multilateralism.