Open AccessA CONSTITUTION FOR KNAVES CROWDS OUT CIVIC VIRTUES *
Author(s) -
Frey Bruno S.
Publication year - 1997
Publication title -
the economic journal
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 4.683
H-Index - 160
eISSN - 1468-0297
pISSN - 0013-0133
DOI - 10.1111/j.1468-0297.1997.tb00006.x
Subject(s) - constitution , crowds , civic virtue , virtue , state (computer science) , crowding out , political science , law and economics , law , order (exchange) , sociology , business , economics , politics , computer security , computer science , finance , algorithm , monetary economics
When discussing constitutional design, economists concentrate on the propensity of individuals to free ride. Preventing opportunistic behaviour by knaves has costs by crowding out civic virtue. Another view emphasises active citizen participation in order to bolster civic virtue. A viable constitution must therefore be strict enough to deter exploitative behaviour. At the same time, the constitution should fundamentally convey trust towards its citizens and politicians. Distrusting public laws risk destroying the positive attitude of citizens and politicians towards the state. Civic virtue can be maintained and fostered by direct citizen participation via popular referenda and initiatives.