Open AccessTHE GENERALITY OF PARTICULAR THOUGHT
Author(s) -
Dickie Imogen
Publication year - 2010
Publication title -
the philosophical quarterly
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.095
H-Index - 45
eISSN - 1467-9213
pISSN - 0031-8094
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2009.629.x
Subject(s) - generality , art history , sociology , art , epistemology , philosophy , psychology , psychotherapist
A bstract This paper is about the claim that, necessarily, a subject who can think that a is F must also have the capacities to think that a is G, a is H, a is I, and so on (for some reasonable range of G, H, I), and that b is F, c is F, d is F, and so on (for some reasonable range of b, c, d). I set out, and raise objections to, two arguments for a strong version of this claim (Gareth Evans' generality constraint). I present a new argument for a weaker version of the claim, and sketch some directions of enquiry which this new argument opens up.