Open AccessThe Politics of Trade Agreement Design: Revisiting the Depth–Flexibility Nexus
Author(s) -
Baccini Leonardo,
Dür Andreas,
Elsig Manfred
Publication year - 2015
Publication title -
international studies quarterly
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.897
H-Index - 100
eISSN - 1468-2478
pISSN - 0020-8833
DOI - 10.1111/isqu.12188
Subject(s) - flexibility (engineering) , nexus (standard) , politics , set (abstract data type) , economics , descriptive statistics , international relations , positive economics , political science , computer science , statistics , law , mathematics , management , programming language , embedded system
Existing research indicates the interrelated nature of different dimensions of the design of international institutions. In particular, it shows the greater flexibility of deep agreements. We argue—and demonstrate empirically—that the positive relationship between depth and flexibility holds for preferential trade agreements ( PTA s). But we add two qualifications to the conventional wisdom that depth and flexibility go hand in hand. First, we argue that the positive relationship between depth and flexibility proves weaker for democracies than for nondemocracies. Second, when making deep agreements more flexible, countries also add strings to the use of the additional flexibility provisions. An original data set on the design of 587 PTA s allows us to test our arguments. Both descriptive evidence and multivariate statistics support the theoretical expectations. The findings contribute to the literatures on the design of international institutions and the causes and consequences of PTA s.