Open AccessRemittances and Democratization
Author(s) -
EscribàFolch Abel,
Meseguer Covadonga,
Wright Joseph
Publication year - 2015
Publication title -
international studies quarterly
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.897
H-Index - 100
eISSN - 1468-2478
pISSN - 0020-8833
DOI - 10.1111/isqu.12180
Subject(s) - autocracy , dictatorship , democratization , argument (complex analysis) , economics , revenue , democracy , tax revenue , state (computer science) , monetary economics , development economics , macroeconomics , political science , politics , law , computer science , biochemistry , chemistry , accounting , algorithm
Do remittances stabilize autocracies? Remittances—money sent by foreign workers to individuals in their home country—differ from other sources of external non‐tax revenue, such as foreign aid, because they accrue directly to individuals and thus raise the incomes of households. We argue that remittances increase the likelihood of democratic transition by undermining electoral support for autocratic incumbents in party‐based regimes. Remittances therefore make voters less dependent on state transfers. As a result, autocracies that rely heavily on the broad‐based distribution of spoils for their survival, namely party‐based regimes, should prove especially vulnerable to increases in remittances. Evidence consistent with this argument suggests that remittances promote democratization in some dictatorships.