Open AccessScreening Out Risk: IGO s, Member State Selection, and Interstate Conflict, 1951–2000
Author(s) -
Donno Daniela,
Metzger Shawna K.,
Russett Bruce
Publication year - 2015
Publication title -
international studies quarterly
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.897
H-Index - 100
eISSN - 1468-2478
pISSN - 0020-8833
DOI - 10.1111/isqu.12177
Subject(s) - mandate , guard (computer science) , incentive , state (computer science) , selection (genetic algorithm) , political science , political economy , economics , law , computer science , microeconomics , algorithm , artificial intelligence , programming language
Do intergovernmental organizations ( IGO s) screen out conflict‐prone states? We argue that IGO s have incentives to guard against admitting new members that pose significant security risks. Using a data set based on state– IGO pairings, we find clear evidence of screening: As security risk increases, the probability of IGO membership declines. Our findings underscore the importance of accounting for possible selection bias when studying the effects of IGO membership on conflict. Indeed, the types of IGO s sometimes found to be most effective at promoting peace—namely highly institutionalized organizations and those with a security mandate—also prove particularly selective and sensitive to risk.