Open AccessExplaining Extremity in the Foreign Policies of Parliamentary Democracies
Author(s) -
Beasley Ryan K.,
Kaarbo Juliet
Publication year - 2014
Publication title -
international studies quarterly
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.897
H-Index - 100
eISSN - 1468-2478
pISSN - 0020-8833
DOI - 10.1111/isqu.12164
Subject(s) - argument (complex analysis) , foreign policy , democracy , test (biology) , set (abstract data type) , political economy , political science , economics , public administration , law , politics , computer science , paleontology , biochemistry , chemistry , biology , programming language
Why do multiparty cabinets in parliamentary democracies produce more extreme foreign policies than single‐party cabinets? Our paper argues that particular institutional and psychological dynamics explain this difference. We test this argument using a global events data set incorporating foreign policy behaviors of numerous multiparty and single‐party governments. We find that more parties and weak parliaments promote extremity in coalitions, but parliamentary strength has the opposite effect for single‐party governments. This study challenges existing expectations about the impact of democratic institutions on foreign policy.