Open AccessElectoral Margins and American Foreign Policy 1
Author(s) -
Potter Philip B. K.
Publication year - 2013
Publication title -
international studies quarterly
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.897
H-Index - 100
eISSN - 1468-2478
pISSN - 0020-8833
DOI - 10.1111/isqu.12040
Subject(s) - victory , diplomacy , foreign policy , leverage (statistics) , political economy , presidential system , political science , politics , international relations , economics , margin (machine learning) , constraint (computer aided design) , presidential election , power (physics) , political capital , law , mechanical engineering , physics , quantum mechanics , machine learning , computer science , engineering
Potter, Philip B. K. (2013) Electoral Margins and American Foreign Policy. International Studies Quarterly , doi: 10.1111/isqu.12040
© 2013 International Studies Association Conventional wisdom holds that large margins of electoral victory contribute to presidential power. How does this variation in power impact U.S. foreign policy? I argue here that presidents who win elections by a substantial margin authorize the use of substantial military force more regularly, but do so at the expense of personal diplomacy and low‐level crisis engagement. This distinction stems from the variation in the external constraint that other political actors place on these policies. New presidents who are empowered by a decisive election have more leverage and are therefore better able to pursue otherwise constrained foreign policies such as the use of major force. In contrast, those who win by smaller margins have less political capital and are forced disproportionately to the less constrained arenas of diplomacy and crisis intervention.