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Iris Murdoch, privacy, and the limits of moral testimony
Author(s) -
Mason Cathy
Publication year - 2022
Publication title -
european journal of philosophy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.42
H-Index - 36
eISSN - 1468-0378
pISSN - 0966-8373
DOI - 10.1111/ejop.12721
Subject(s) - acknowledgement , moral disengagement , moral psychology , epistemology , moral reasoning , psychology , sociology , social psychology , philosophy , computer science , computer security
Recent discussions of moral testimony have focused on the acceptability of forming beliefs on the basis of moral testimony, but there has been little acknowledgement of the limits to testimony's capacity to convey moral knowledge. In this paper I outline one such limit, drawing on Iris Murdoch's conception of private moral concepts. Such concepts, I suggest, plausibly play an important role in moral thought, and yet moral knowledge expressed in them cannot be testimonially acquired.