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Introspective acquaintance: An integration account
Author(s) -
Giustina Anna
Publication year - 2023
Publication title -
european journal of philosophy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.42
H-Index - 36
eISSN - 1468-0378
pISSN - 0966-8373
DOI - 10.1111/ejop.12690
Subject(s) - introspection , extant taxon , phenomenology (philosophy) , epistemology , psychology , neglect , relation (database) , cognitive science , empirical research , consciousness , cognitive psychology , computer science , philosophy , psychiatry , database , evolutionary biology , biology
In this paper, I develop a new version of the acquaintance view of the nature of introspection of phenomenal states. On the acquaintance view, when one introspects a current phenomenal state of one's, one bears to it the relation of introspective acquaintance. Extant versions of the acquaintance view neglect what I call the phenomenal modification problem . The problem, articulated by Franz Brentano in his Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint , is that drawing introspective attention to one's current conscious experience may modify its phenomenology. Failing to take phenomenal modification into account affects the adequacy of extant versions of the acquaintance view. The purpose of this paper is to develop a better version, the integration account , that meets the phenomenal modification challenge while preserving the merits of other versions.