Kant, Frege, and the normativity of logic: MacFarlane 's argument for common ground

According to what used to be the standard view (Poincaré, Wang, etc.), although Frege endorses, and Kant denies, the claim that arithmetic is reducible to logic, there is not a substantive disagreement between them because their conceptions of logic are too different. In his “Frege, Kant, and the Logic in Logicism,” John MacFarlane aims to establish that Frege and Kant do share enough of a conception of logic for this to be a substantive, judicable dispute. MacFarlane maintains that for both Frege and Kant, the fundamental defining characteristic of logic is “that it provides norms for thought as such ” (MacFarlane, 2002, p.57). I defend the standard view. I show that MacFarlane's argument rests on conflating the way that pure general logic is normative as a canon and as a propaedeutic, and that once these are distinguished the argument is blocked.