Corrupt Bookmaking in a Fixed Odds Illegal Betting Market | Zendy

Bag Parimal Kanti | Zendy; Saha Bibhas | Zendy

AI Assistant Blog Pricing

Home ZAIA Blog

Open Access

Corrupt Bookmaking in a Fixed Odds Illegal Betting Market

Author(s) -

Bag Parimal Kanti,

Saha Bibhas

Publication year - 2017

Publication title -

the economic journal

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Journals

SCImago Journal Rank - 4.683

H-Index - 160

eISSN - 1468-0297

pISSN - 0013-0133

DOI - 10.1111/ecoj.12483

Subject(s) - contest , odds , enforcement , suspect , economics , favourite , law and economics , advertising , business , actuarial science , criminology , political science , law , sociology , computer science , logistic regression , machine learning

Illegal betting in a two‐team sports contest is studied with player sabotage instigated by a monopolist bookmaker. Whereas punters hold beliefs about the teams’ winning chances correlated with Nature's draw, the bookmaker's information is noise‐free. Enforcement investigates with a higher probability, the greater the upset. In such an environment, if punters do not suspect match‐fixing, the favourite is bribed, thus creating upsets and intensifying subsequent investigations. Match‐fixing continues to hold even when punters are rational, provided that the bookie's beliefs are noisy: the bookie bribes the team he thinks is the favourite and the bettors bet on their perceived favourites.

The content you want is available to Zendy users.

Already have an account? Click here to sign in.

Having issues? You can contact us here

Accelerating Research