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Incentives in the Public Sector: Evidence from a Government Agency
Author(s) -
Burgess Simon,
Propper Carol,
Ratto Marisa,
Tominey Emma
Publication year - 2017
Publication title -
the economic journal
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 4.683
H-Index - 160
eISSN - 1468-0297
pISSN - 0013-0133
DOI - 10.1111/ecoj.12422
Subject(s) - incentive , agency (philosophy) , public sector , government (linguistics) , business , public economics , empirical evidence , public administration , economics , political science , market economy , economy , sociology , linguistics , philosophy , epistemology , social science
We study the impact of team‐based performance pay in a major UK government agency, the public employment service. The scheme covered quantity and quality targets, measured with varying degrees of precision. We use unique data from the agency's performance management system and personnel records, linked to local labour market data. We show that on average the scheme had no significant effect but had a substantial positive effect in small teams, fitting an explanation combining free riding and peer monitoring. The impact was greater on better‐measured quantity outcomes than quality outcomes. The scheme was very cost effective in small offices.

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