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Auction Format and Auction Sequence in Multi‐item Multi‐unit Auctions: An Experimental Study
Author(s) -
Betz Regina,
Greiner Ben,
Schweitzer Sascha,
Seifert Stefan
Publication year - 2017
Publication title -
the economic journal
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 4.683
H-Index - 160
eISSN - 1468-0297
pISSN - 0013-0133
DOI - 10.1111/ecoj.12403
Subject(s) - common value auction , multiunit auction , vickrey–clarke–groves auction , sequence (biology) , forward auction , vickrey auction , generalized second price auction , unit (ring theory) , english auction , reverse auction , computer science , unique bid auction , auction theory , microeconomics , business , economics , mathematics , chemistry , biochemistry , mathematics education
We experimentally study the effect of auction format (sealed‐bid versus closed clock versus open clock) and auction sequence (simultaneous versus sequential) on bidding behaviour and auction outcomes in auctions of multiple related multi‐unit items. Prominent field applications are the sale of emission permits, fishing rights, and electricity. We find that, when auctioning simultaneously, clock auctions outperform sealed‐bid auctions in terms of efficiency and revenues. This advantage disappears when the items are auctioned sequentially. In addition, auctioning sequentially has positive effects on total revenues across all auction formats, resulting from fiercer competition on the item auctioned first.

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