Open AccessA Theory of Political Entrenchment
Author(s) -
SaintPaul Gilles,
Ticchi Davide,
Vindigni Andrea
Publication year - 2016
Publication title -
the economic journal
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 4.683
H-Index - 160
eISSN - 1468-0297
pISSN - 0013-0133
DOI - 10.1111/ecoj.12215
Subject(s) - abu dhabi , saint , politics , library science , political science , media studies , economic history , art history , sociology , history , computer science , law , archaeology , metropolitan area
Can an incumbent political party increase its chances at re‐election by implementing inefficient policies that harm its constituency? This paper studies the possibility of such a phenomenon, which we label political entrenchment. We use a two‐party dynamic model of redistribution with probabilistic voting. Political entrenchment by the Left occurs only if incumbency rents are sufficiently high. Low‐skill citizens may vote for this party even though they rationally expect the adoption of these policies. We discuss: the possibility of entrenchment by the Right; the scope for commitment to avoid entrenchment policies; and the effect of state capacity, income inequality and party popularity on the likelihood of entrenchment. We illustrate our theory with a number of historical examples.