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Information disclosure in dynamic research contests
Author(s) -
Chen Bo,
Chen Bo,
Knyazev Dmitriy
Publication year - 2022
Publication title -
the rand journal of economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 3.687
H-Index - 108
eISSN - 1756-2171
pISSN - 0741-6261
DOI - 10.1111/1756-2171.12402
Subject(s) - contest , public disclosure , plan (archaeology) , full disclosure , microeconomics , computer science , economics , business , political science , computer security , law , history , engineering , mechanical engineering , archaeology
We study information disclosure in a dynamic multi‐agent research contest, where each agent privately searches for innovations and submits his best to compete for a winner‐takes‐all prize (Taylor, 1995). Different disclosure policies on the agents' submissions induce different equilibrium behavior, making the design of disclosure a useful instrument for contest sponsors. We analyze and compare various information disclosure policies in the contest with finite or infinite horizons. With an endogenously chosen prize, the public disclosure policy, where submissions are revealed immediately, implements the sponsor's first‐best research plan and is an optimal policy in the infinite horizon.