Categorical Norms and Convention‐Relativism about Epistemic Discourse

Allan Hazlett has recently developed an alternative to the most popular form of anti‐realism about epistemic normativity, epistemic expressivism. He calls it “convention‐relativism about epistemic discourse”. The view deserves more attention. In this paper, I give it attention in the form of an objection. Specifically, my objection turns on a distinction between inescapable and categorical norms. While I agree with Hazlett that convention‐relativism is consistent with inescapable epistemic norms, I argue that it is not consistent with categorical epistemic norms. I then argue that Hazlett's account of a controversial upshot of convention‐relativism – namely, that epistemic discourse is not “normative” – should, but does not, adequately address the question of whether epistemic norms are categorical. This leads to a more general discussion of anti‐realism in epistemology.