Rational Agency without Self‐Knowledge: Could ‘We’ Replace ‘I’?

It has been claimed that we need singular self‐knowledge (knowledge involving the concept ‘I’) to function properly as rational agents. I argue that this is not strictly true: agents in certain relations could dispense with singular self‐knowledge and instead rely on plural self‐knowledge (knowledge involving the concept ‘we’). In defending the possibility of this kind of ‘selfless agent’, I thereby defend the possibility of a certain kind of ‘seamless’ collective agency; agency in a group of agents who have no singular self‐knowledge, who do not know which member of the group they are. I discuss four specific functions for which singular self‐knowledge has been thought indispensable: distinguishing intentional from unintentional actions, connecting non‐indexical knowledge with action, reflecting on our own reasoning, and identifying which ultimate practical reasons we have. I argue in each case that by establishing certain relations between agents – relations I label ‘motor vulnerability’, ‘cognitive vulnerability’, ‘evidential unity’ and ‘moral unity’ – we would allow those agents to do everything a rational agent needs to do while relying only on plural, rather than singular, self‐knowledge. Finally, I consider the objection that any agents who met the conditions I lay out for selfless agency would thereby cease to qualify as distinct agents, merging into a single agent without agential parts. Against this objection, I argue that we should recognise the possibility of simultaneous agency in whole and parts, and not regard either as disqualifying the other.