Open AccessRegulations as Arbiters of Risk: Great Britain, Germany, and the Hazardous Waste Trade in Western Europe
Author(s) -
O'Neill Kate
Publication year - 1997
Publication title -
international studies quarterly
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.897
H-Index - 100
eISSN - 1468-2478
pISSN - 0020-8833
DOI - 10.1111/1468-2478.00063
Subject(s) - hazardous waste , argument (complex analysis) , environmental regulation , business , toxic waste , state (computer science) , western europe , empirical evidence , international trade , economics , public economics , waste management , engineering , european union , biochemistry , chemistry , philosophy , epistemology , algorithm , computer science
This article seeks to explain why Great Britain is one of the world's largest importers of hazardous wastes, while Germany, in contrast, is a waste exporter. Why one country exhibits such risk‐acceptance behavior, while another is so risk averse, I argue, depends on differences between their national systems of environmental regulation. The style and structure of Britain's regulatory system, unlike that of Germany and its other partners in Western Europe, gives a high degree of leeway to private firms, filtering out the preferences of environmental groups and public opinion, thus enabling and facilitating the importation of hazardous wastes by waste disposal companies. The empirical section tests this argument against two alternative explanations: a state‐centric explanation based on individual government's calculations of the relevant costs and benefits associated with the waste trade, and second, a “comparative advantage” explanation, based on the technological superiority of Britain's waste disposal facilities. The conclusion draws out the implication for international environmental regulation and for domestic‐level regulatory change.