Open AccessDemocratising Party Leadership Selection in B elgium: Motivations and Decision Makers
Author(s) -
Wauters Bram
Publication year - 2014
Publication title -
political studies
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.406
H-Index - 83
eISSN - 1467-9248
pISSN - 0032-3217
DOI - 10.1111/1467-9248.12002
Subject(s) - opposition (politics) , elite , political science , politics , power (physics) , position (finance) , selection (genetic algorithm) , multi party system , political economy , public relations , public administration , law , sociology , business , democracy , computer science , physics , finance , quantum mechanics , artificial intelligence
Political parties are increasingly adopting more inclusive procedures to select their party leader, most notably by introducing party primaries. This article tries to detect motives and decision makers for this introduction in Belgian parties. The literature on W estminster‐style parties contends that party elites only reluctantly transfer more power from the parliamentary party group ( PPG ) to party members. They do so only when finding themselves in a weak position: after electoral defeat, when in opposition, when other parties are doing so or when the party is new. The situation in B elgium is different, as is demonstrated with quantitative and qualitative data. Mostly, the party elite was keen on introducing party primaries and took the initiative itself to carry them through. The mechanism at work, however, is the same as in Westminster parties: avoiding too much power for middle‐level elites. Because of the different starting position (party delegates selecting the leader), the decision‐making process looks completely different. We also argue that the results from Belgian parties might apply to consensus democracies in general.